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Economics have long concentrated almost exclusively on the analysis of purely
competitive market structures, in which the institutional framework is
exogenously determined and very weakly specified. But if it is more and more
recognised that this model falls short of characterising market economies in
which the price system operates with costs, and necessitates specific
institutions, and in which firms are more than purely rhetorical devices, an
alternative unified market economy theory is still missing. The main reason is
that, outside the structuralist tradition, the market appears as a polysemic
concept (Hodgson 1988) associated with various theoretical levels and dealing
with extremely specific economic problems.
However, both the New Institutional Economics (Langlois 1986) and the
Industrial Dynamics approaches (Carlsson 1989) aim at identifying some
common themes which represent new directions in economic theory. The
market theme constitutes of course one of the most discussed subjects,
especially (not surprisingly) in an Austrian perspective. But if it is well known
that the Austrian analysis of the market process represents (if we may
paraphrase F.Hahn) a real ‘base camp’ for an alternative theory of the co-
ordination of economic activities, a growing number of works are nowadays
underlining the potential fruitful connections between Austrian and
Institutional works on markets (O'Driscoll, Rizzo 1996) (Boettke, Prychitko
1994) (Wynarczyk 1992).2
Our contribution aims precisely at revealing the terms of a confrontation
between these two schools concerning the nature and the role of markets. In
this perspective, we exhibit not only the common features, but also the possible
complementarity of the market approaches contained in both theories.
The attempts to bring together two approaches traditionally considered as
being antinomic are very recent. Though such difficult but fruitful
confrontation have produced numerous publications
1, the question of the
nature and the role of the market do not appear to have been systematically
treated. After stressing the obstacles, the difficulties and the broad lines of a
dialogue between two rival theories (Section 1), we will show that these two
traditions converge in offering a processual market representation in an
economic world characterised by strong uncertainty and historical influence
(Section 2). The institutional element plays in this context a very ambiguous
role: not only do institutions constitute an external framework (one that
removes uncertainty) for market transactions (Commons 1934), they also
appear to be internal to individual transactions, those ones leading to their
adjustment and evolution. Following Lachmann (1994) the problem thus
becomes to provide a joint analysis of the permanency and flexibility of
institutions. Such analysis, based on a combination of elements stemming from
both traditions
2 gives the opportunity to build an alternative framework which
offers an approach to individual and group problem-solving activity within
institutional-knowledge constraints (Section 3)
3.
Austrian and Old Institutional Economics: from rivalry to dialogue
Why lead a confrontation between Austrians and Institutionalists on market
process? New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Langlois 1986) program intend to
draw one’s inspiration from old Austrian economics not from Old Institutional3
Economics (OIE) regarded generally as theoretically inconsistent. Nevertheless,
the contemporary debate on the evolutionary nature of the firm and market,
and on economic as a process leads to a revival of the OIE way of analysing
economics as an evolutionary science (Hodgson 1994; 1996). In some
comparisons, OIE and NEI are seen as alternative or complementary programs
(Hodgson 1989) (Langlois 1986; 1989) (Leathers 1989) (Rutherford 1989b; 1994)
(Vanberg 1989). If we consider, after Langlois, that NIE is torn between a neo-
classical and an Austrian approach, we can say that OIE is surely an alternative
program to the neo-classical one, but it is not so clear when it comes to the
Austrian approach.
It is the problematic confrontation of Austrian and Old Institutional
Economics that we briefly discuss now.
A missed appointment
The story begins with a missed appointment, a large mutual ignorance and a
misconception of the respective contributions of OIE and Austrians to
economics.
It is a well-known episode in the history of economic thought that Veblen
failed to de-homogenise Jevon’s, Walras’s and Menger’s conceptions of
economic behaviour when examining the marginalist preconception of human
nature
4 (Langlois 1989). Veblen
5 was unaware of Menger’s contribution to an
economic theory of social institutions and ignored the famous distinction
between pragmatic and organic institutions.
However, Veblen’s works shared Menger’s attacks of the German Historical
School’s argument that the historical and social diversity of institutions
prohibits a theoretical generalisation. They also both stress the importance of
ridding social theory of teleological elements of explanation. In distinguishing
between pragmatic and organic institutions, Menger emphasises the necessity4
for social science to analyse how organic institutions evolved without a
‘common will directed toward establishing them’ (Menger 1963, p.146). Using
the biological metaphor of the evolutionary framework of explanation along a
Darwinian perspective, Veblen saw institutions as the product of ‘blind
cumulative causation’. But along the ‘compositive method’ of Menger’s
approach, the stress is put on individuals pursuing their own interests and on
an invisible-hand explanation of the formation of complex social phenomena.
For Veblen, there is a self-reinforcing causality between individuals and
culture, neither of them being exclusive for social explanation
6.
The same way Veblen failed to take into account Menger's work, Hayek
failed to take into account Veblen's.
Hayek’s comments on Institutional economics in general are negative and
grounded on very few arguments. According to him, Institutionalism is an
American heir of German historicism and thus shares the same critique: they
didn’t produce a theory of institutions but a simple description, that is
monographs without scientific economic analysis. While Hayek called for a
study of evolutionary process of social phenomena similar to biological
selection, he surprisingly didn’t refer at all to Veblen’s evolutionism, even as an
opponent. As Leathers shows, Hayek has nevertheless developed a theory of
cultural evolution grounded on an instinctual conception of human nature with
numerous interesting parallels with Veblen’s
7 (Leather 1990).
Neither Commons has taken into account the Austrian theory of institutions
and evolution. Menger’s works are evaluated in the line of their echoes with
Marginalism or Methodenstreit. So despite some strong common elements in
the Austrian and the OIE thought, founders didn’t hold a dialogue
8.
Austrian and OIE as antithetic5
The main reason called for, is that Austrian is a market focus tradition while
OIE is an institutional focus tradition. As Samuels clearly states: ‘Austrians
stress the markets as the allocative mechanism, Institutionalists stress the
institutions and power structure which form and operate through the market as
the real allocative mechanism’ (1989, p.59-60). Austrians didn’t ignore the
existence of organisation and State regulation, they also significantly
contributed to an evolutionary conception of the economic system. But they are
mainly interested by abstracting the function and essence of the market as a
system of order from the historical specificity of economic systems. By contrast,
OIE do not see specific market structures as inherently ‘normal’ or ‘natural’
(Miller 1989) and do not agree that markets can be analysed qua market forces.
The concept of ‘market’ is seen as a metaphor for the institutions, which form
its structure and operate through it (Samuels 1995). They do not take the actual
legal basis of capitalist system for granted, rather they questioned the
formation and consequences of property rights. Moreover, according to OIE,
government, legal foundations and politics inextricably intertwine with the
operation of markets (Samuels 1989) and cannot be ‘exogeneised’.
A consequence is that while Austrians emphasise non-–deliberative decision
making, OIE emphasises deliberative decision making or, put in Merger’s
dichotomy, Austrians are organic institutions focused when Institutionalists are
pragmatic institutions focused. For OIE, the twentieth century economic system
cannot be understood with a pure market analysis. This anticipates the
contemporary interest for a theoretical status of the firm, stressing the economic
study on the ‘major institution of capitalism’, the business enterprise.
Corporation cannot be reduced to the idea of the entrepreneur, because it
results of the joint action of many groups. Veblen initiated the managerial
conception of the firm and the corporate control problem that bankers,
shareholders and managers interaction carry (Veblen 1904). For Commons, the6
collective action in going concerns is the main characteristic of actual economic
system. He particularly insisted on the dual agency relationship
(workers/employers) torn between co-operation and conflict and on the legal
working rules supporting the system (Commons 1934). A corollary of this so
called ‘decision making’ point of view is that Institutionalists consider analysis
of power structure and of government agency in the formation and
performance of markets to be necessary (Samuels 1995).
This great difference leads to a strong ideological opposition: Austrians are
pro-market while Institutionalists think that market system needs social control
and reform. According to the former, the scope of government activity must be
limited in the defence of freedom (stated in political terms), or contractual
liberty (stated in economics terms), and legislation must conform to the market
order. Institutionalists emphasise that the free market economy is itself a
system of social control, and that specific markets are what they are, and
perform as they do, because institutions operate as a social control (Samuels
1995). They deny that markets are automatically beneficent and suggest that a
democratic economic government can improve over existing arrangements.
They do not see market and government as the two terms of an analytical
opposition, but as Polanyi says, ‘the road to the free market was opened and
kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organised and
controlled interventionism’ (1994, p.141).
Austrian and Institutionalist are also seen as two strong and durable
dissenting traditions in the light of economic methodology.
OIE is often misconceived as the American Historical School. Consequently,
Austrians and OIE are seen as representative opponents in the Methodenstreit
9.
The first principle of the opposition is the duality: theory versus history.
According to Austrians, the nature of the economic problem is the discovery7
and description of general laws that are present in any economic system. OIE
denies the universality of economic laws that are considered, on the contrary,
as embedded in institutional or historical circumstances
10. A consequence of
these opposite views is that Austrians are supposed to adopt an a priori
deductive reasoning when Institutionalists are rather empiricists and
pragmatists. The latter cannot accept the logical consistence of assumptions as a
criteria of scientificity but rather that economic propositions are heuristics for
social design (Miller 1989) (Gordon 1989) (Samuels 1989).
A last notable methodological opposition can be noticed: the explanatory
variables in economic theory are individuals for the first, and institutions for
the latter. The Austrian subjectivism is the foundation of its methodological
individualism in contrast with the so-called Institutionalist’s holism. According
to Austrians, social structures are the unintentional result of the individuals
self-seeking interests whereas for OIE institutions mould individual
preferences and choices.
If many things seem to split the two traditions, Samuels and Boettke
(respectively neo-Institutionalist and neo-Austrian) nevertheless defend the
idea that there ‘seemed to be significant common subject-matter and much
parallel substantive content’ (Samuels 1989, p.49).
The chief point of convergence is that they are outsiders vis-à-vis neo-
classicism. As we shall explain in the next section, they both object to a-
temporal equilibrium analysis. Economy is rather viewed as a dynamic process
in an evolutionary perspective. They also contest the neo-classical conception of
economic behaviour seen as passive and predetermined. They share emphasis
on economics as a praxeological science in an uncertain environment, imperfect
knowledge and radically indeterminate future. Time is a major issue in the8
necessary acquisition of knowledge governing human action, and institutions
are a media for learning and for complex social interactions.
The market as an economic process: an ecumenical point of view
Presenting the intent of his 1986's book, The Market as an Economic Process,
Lachmann explains:
The central idea of this book is the market regarded as an economic process,
that is, an ongoing process, impelled by the diversity of aims and resources
and the divergence of expectations, ever changing in a world of unexpected
change. It is my hope that this idea may also gain some sympathy from those
whose inspiration flows from other than Austrian sources (1986, p.x)
11.
A few years later, authors such as Boettke and Prychitko (1994) echoed this
will by stressing the relevance of exchanges with the Institutional work for the
future trends of the Austrian theory of market processes. The question is then
to determine the terms of such an exchange, which can only be done after
singling out a minimum amount of features common to both approaches.
The processual nature of economic phenomena
The first feature, at the core of our project, relates to the dismissal of the notion
of atemporal equilibrium that is ‘an equilibrium in which economic actions at a
particular point in time are co-ordinated independent of what transpired just
before that instant and what may transpire just after’ (Garrison 1986, p.89).
Such dismissal represents, as everyone knows, one of the most obvious
features of the Austrian economics. By rejecting the concept of atemporal
equilibrium, the Austrian school rejects the possibility of an objective9
knowledge of economic phenomena. The outcomes of the running of the
market system cannot be objectively known, the adjustment process being
likely to take on various forms which reflect the modes of interaction between
individual plans. Markets are then best regarded as processes and the market
economy is defined as ‘a network of markets in each of which, and between
which, phenomena that may be described in terms of processes are occurring’
(Lachmann 1986, p.3).
The concept of process consists of two distinct elements (Ioannides 1992): (1)
the principle of endogeneity which states that all economic processes are
endogenously mobilised, and (2) time, underlining the fact that ‘the sequence
of events becomes an issue of fundamental importance, as each event really
constitutes the cause of the one succeeding it’ (ibid., p.9). Finally ‘the outcomes
of market depend of what happens at their various stages and on the order in
which events happen. This means in particular that antecedents will influence
subsequent events in so far as acting men attribute significance to them and
that therefore the order in which events happen matters’ (Lachmann 1986, p.4).
But the rejection of the state of equilibrium doesn't necessarily mean the
rejection of the concept of equilibrium itself. First of all, because the idea of an
individual equilibrium which implies that all aspects of an individual plan are
compatible with each other is assumed, in the Austrian tradition, to hold a
priori, even if the maintenance of such equilibrium over time requires that the
data generated by the economy does not disrupt the agent's expectations.
Second, because the traditional Austrian theory of market processes
12 does not
rule out the idea of a trend towards a market equilibrium. On the contrary, it
exists between the Lachmann's view of the fundamental indeterminateness of
the market process and Mises's belief in the a priori nature of the tendency
toward equilibrium, a wide range of positions, which are not really inconsistent
with the notion of equilibrium
13. The Hayekian and the Kirznerian stands are,10
in this point of view, representative of the place and the role assigned by this
traditional Austrian theory to the notion of equilibrium. Whereas for Hayek
(1937) the degree of indeterminateness of the market equilibrium viewed as the
outcome of the interaction of several minds functioning independently from
each other is removed by the empirical convergence of the expectations, the
entrepreneur is the one who, according to Kirzner (1973; 1979; 1985; 1992), acts
as the stabilising force and the adjustment of the market process towards
equilibrium, by discovering and cancelling market errors, that is by exploiting
profit opportunities.
Nowadays, the idea of a trend towards equilibrium is however widely
criticised within the Austrian family itself. Following O'Driscoll and Rizzo it is
possible to state that ‘today many, if not all, Austrians accept the importance of
disequilibrating tendencies in markets’ (1996, p.xviii)
14. Indeed, it appears more
and more clearly, from an Austrian point of view, that ‘the equilibrium
metaphor has proven misleading and that the time has come to seek a less
mechanical metaphor, one that does not trivialise the incessant change of
market processes’ (Boettke, Horwitz, Prychitko 1994, p.65). In particular, the
question is to oppose to the Hayekian argument, which sees equilibrium as an
empirical fact, the idea that if the equilibrating tendencies of markets are an
empirical regularity, then human society must be tending towards a state of
affairs without money, firms, or market institutions.
The important point here is that the recognition of the importance of
disequilibrating forces goes together with another feature of modern Austrian
economics, that is with a greater attention given to the prerequisites for
equilibrating behaviour. As soon as the disequilibrating tendencies in markets
are not simply the result of changes in the exogenous data, but arise from the
source of equilibrating behaviour (the indeterminate response to perceived
profit opportunities), it becomes necessary to discover the co-operating11
conditions that are needed to make equilibration more or less likely (O'Driscoll,
Rizzo 1996, p.xxi). In other words, the problem is to determine the ordering
principles which produce mutually reinforcing sets of expectations without
denying that some expectations will be wrong (Boettke, Horwitz, Prychitko
1994)
15. Such ordering principles will assume different forms in different
markets, depending on what Lachmann (1986) calls the proximity of agents and
their range of action.
The concept of pattern co-ordination proposed by O'Driscoll and Rizzo
(1996) makes it possible to incorporate this dynamic character of the notion of
market process, thus providing a solution to the problem of identifying
ordering principles. Based on the distinction between typical and unique
events
16, the pattern co-ordination analysis indicates that if the market is able to
co-ordinate typical events and consequently to stabilise the economy, it is no
more the case when the unique characteristics of human actions are taken into
account. Indeed in this last case the market process becomes entirely
indeterminate and the co-ordination of plans needs alternative co-ordination
mechanisms. It is here important to notice that this analysis is general, insofar
as it can deal with the numerous Austrian approaches of market process, the
convergence towards equilibrium being a very particular occurrence in which
identical events are repeated period after period.
If Institutionalists didn’t use the term “market process”, which is an Austrian
copyright, they share the interest in the study of economic process. A
distinctive characteristic of Institutional economics is its emphasis upon the
concept of change. As Hamilton put:
The Institutionalist (...) considers change to be part of the economic process.
Instead of viewing the economy as a fixed system periodically prodded into12
movement to a new point of non-motion, he holds that the economy is at all
times undergoing a process of cumulative change, and that the study of
economics is the study of process (Hamilton 1973, p.17).
Institutionalism thus rejects, along the Austrian approach, an atemporal
equilibrium conception of the economy. ‘The conception of the economy is of
an evolving, open system in historical time, subject to processes of cumulative
causation -instead of approaches to theorising that focus exclusively on
mechanical equilibria’ (Hodgson 1994, pp.68-69). With some notable
differences, Veblen and Commons principal preoccupation was to analyse the
process of change in the modern economy, and the neo-classical and
marginalist conception of economic equilibrium was, according to them,
inadequate for this theoretical purpose.
Veblen gave further grounds for developing an evolutionary economics, by
stressing the processes of economic evolution and technological transformation.
According to him, economics must break with its Newtonian preconceptions
that make it no more than a ‘taxonomic science’, in order to become an
evolutionary science (Veblen 1898). His idea is that the economic system is not
a self-balancing mechanism, but a ‘cumulatively unfolding process’. For him,
‘Modern science is becoming substantially a theory of the process of
consecutive change, realise to be self-continuing or self-propagating and to
have no final term’
17. The economic change and evolution process is captured
by the Veblenian concept of cumulative causation: the prevailing way of
thinking and acting are cumulatively reinforced and lead to locked-in
phenomena. Hodgson interprets Veblen’s view as a positive feedback analysis,
in opposition to the neo-classical negative feedback conception (Hodgson 1994).
In the latter the economic movement is stabilised and even broken, whereas in
the first it is amplified and leads to a dynamic change with self-reinforcing13
property. These self-reinforcing attributes are a factor of continuity in this
process of continuous change. For Veblen, the stability of the economic system
depends on the coherence between the factors of continuity and the factors of
change. But this form of equilibrium in the never-ending evolution can be
disrupted when the factors of continuity fail to be coherent with the new
circumstances. Hodgson (1994) thinks that Veblen’s evolutionism fits the
modern biological theory better than the gradualist conception does.
Particularly, the link between crisis and continual change in Veblen's
explanation fits the ‘punctuated-equilibria’ (Eldredge, Gould 1977). There is
something that is transmitted in the process of change and that constitutes the
continuity and the identity of the economic system. But this form of
equilibrium is not at all the same as in neo-classical economics.
In the same perspective, the central problem of economics is, according to
Commons
18, a classical one: how can an order exist out of the conflict of
individual interests due to scarcity? Commons departs himself from the
explanation in terms of automatic harmonisation and unconscious co-operation
generated by the price mechanism. The origin of order lies in what he called
the working rules that specify what individuals can or cannot, must or must
not, may or may not do in their transactions. ‘The working rules regulate
behaviour in such fashion that potential conflicts of interest do not undermine
the security of expectations without which individuals will not be willing to
enter into transactions’ (Ramstad 1990, p.58). But the order grounded on the
working rules of the society is neither natural nor immutable: it is an evolving
order. The actual working rules always give rise to unanticipated
consequences. Disputes and unregulated conflicts of interest are generated by
new circumstances that lead to the rise of new working rules in a process of
‘artificial selection’ conducted by the authority figures that decide conflicts.
Economic process is characterised by conflicting and co-operative transactions14
in many going concerns and by a permanent authoritative adjustment of the
rules, aimed at maintaining the order. The equilibrium can be understood as
the ‘workable mutuality’ and compromise brought by rules out of conflict. But
it is, as for Veblen, an evolutionary perspective unsuitable with atemporal
equilibrium question.
With a very different state of mind, Institutionalits and Austrians thus
converge on some very important points of view about economics. Market
process (enlarged to economic process for Institutionalists) cannot be
understood with an atemporal equilibrium analytical apparatus. The principle
of ‘endogeneity’ and that of ‘time’, that characterise the concept of process, are
significant in the Institutionalist perspective: change is a cumulative process
with reinforcing properties for Veblen, while for Commons change is the joint
effect of unintended results of transactions and the resolution of the conflicts
that emerge; the process is historical because change never produces a return to
a previous state of affairs (positive feed back).
However, the evolutionary point of view doesn’t necessary mean the
rejection of the concept of equilibrium. Equilibrium is a matter of convergence
of the way of thinking and acting, that are transmitted by time and the current
state of affairs in Veblen’s view, whereas it is the workable mutuality and
reasonableness of actual rules that regulate potential conflicts in economic life
according to Commons. For both, as for the Austrians, the meaning of
equilibrium is a question of ordering principle and pattern of co-ordination,
both of which harmonise and secure the agents' expectations. In other words,
equilibrium then does not primarily depend on prices, but on expectations,
information systems, and the interpretative frameworks which are used by
economic agents (Loasby 1991). But this conception of equilibrium is far from
the neo-classical perspective.15
The creative character of human action
A second area of convergence for the Austrian and Institutional approaches,
regarding the analysis of the operation of markets, lies in the fact that they both
take into account the active behaviour of the economic agents
19. This point is
related to the recognition of the ignorance and uncertainty faced by markets
agents as well as to the essential complexity of the market.
This is particularly blatant within the Austrian approach. Actually, one of
the implications of considering the market as a spontaneous order is that no
one has a particular knowledge of all relevant conditions on which economic
action is based. The rejection of the price-taking behaviour and the conception
of the market as a system in constant flux are based on the idea that the flow of
information is the moving force of economic activity. Consequently, ignorance
and uncertainty will surround most market decisions: ‘when a person is
ignorant of particular influences in his economic environment and therefore
uncertain about the success of possible undertakings, he will be alert to new
information, and he will mull over the information he does have in formulating
his decisions’ (High 1994, p.25).
The Austrian School's method of incorporating ignorance, uncertainty, and
expectations into economic theory has been to stress the entrepreneurial
element in human consciousness. Entrepreneurship theory indeed offers an
answer to two important questions raised by the analysis of market processes
(Ioannides 1992): (1) the question of describing the motives that mobilise the
use of knowledge, and (2) the question of the (exact) way this behaviour is
expressed in the market process. More precisely, it is possible to distinguish
two types of answers which refer to two types of active behaviours, each one
referring to the distinction previously pointed out between equilibrium market16
processes and indeterminate market processes (Boettke, Horwitz, Prychitko
1994).
The first type of behaviour is more particularly associated to Kirzner’s work
(1973; 1979; 1985; 1992). Indeed as it is well known, Kirzner defends the idea
that the market economy opens up arbitrage possibilities because of the
ignorance of individuals: finding a good that sells for different prices in the
market is the most obvious example, but Kirzner believes that the discovery of
factors of production that can be transformed into consumer goods can also be
considered as an arbitrage if factor prices are lower than the price of the
consumer good. The essence of the entrepreneurial behaviour is thus the
discovery of profit opportunities. It is however important to notice that if such
an entrepreneurial activity is a product of market disequilibrium, its character
is by definition equilibrating since taking advantage of a profit opportunity is
equivalent to cancelling it. The discovery-arbitrage behaviour represents a force
that constantly pushes the market toward equilibrium.
This first kind of active behaviour is however considered as too poor, that is
too mechanical, by the Austrian analyses which would rather adopt a
Lachmannian reasoning
20. Boettke, Horwitz and Prychitko thus explain that:
‘Austrians have traditionally postulated a world of Robbinsian maximisers, and
allowed the entrepreneur to seek arbitrage opportunities which equilibrate the
market. Such an entrepreneur need only exercise alertness to profit
opportunities. But entrepreneurship is also characterised by judgements about
imagined future opportunities’ (1994, p.65)
21. The problem is hence to focus on
the Lachmannian creative dimension of the entrepreneurial behaviour: ‘the
creative agent builds plans upon her imagination of the future
22 whereas the
discoverer elaborates plans exclusively on the basis of the knowledge at her
disposal’ (Gloria 1996, p.8). However, when the role of judgement is added to
alertness, expectations are granted full force and the satisfaction of some17
individuals' expectations can come only at the expense of the disappointment of
others (Lachmann 1986)
23. The consequence of this is that the market is now
described as a process characterised by unexpected change and inconsistency of
plans, incompatible with a systematic tendency toward equilibrium.
The conception of human action is a cornerstone of Institutional economics.
The revision of the standard economic theory of behaviour was central for its
understanding of social interactions in historical time. Institutionalists wanting
to theorise foundations of economic order and its evolutionary process cannot
be satisfied with the mainstream idea of rational choice, that takes individual
behaviours as a given (Mitchell 1935). On the contrary, they focus on the
formation of preferences (Hodgson 1985) in tight connection with the economic
process itself. In contrast with the hedonist and optimising point of view, the
Institutionalist understanding of human behaviour outlines, on the one hand
the habits, routines, customs and rules that mould individual behaviour and
constitute the larger agency of ex ante co-ordination of social relationships. On
the other hand, individual action is cardinal in the process of change.
Consequently, human nature is seen as an active and creative agency in the
evolutionary course of the economic system.
Veblen underlined the paradox of the hedonistic and rationalist conception
of the economic man: the individual is the first cause of economic phenomena
but, at the same time, its psychology is exogenous and its choices are totally
predetermined in the analysis. Human nature is, in this line, passive, inert and
immutable
24. Veblen opposes to the calculating, optimising agent of the neo-
classical theory a less competent but less determined and more purposeful
individual. The concept of habits plays a central role in the Institutionalist
picture of the economic man
25. ‘Habits are a form of non-reflexive behaviour
that arises in repetitive situations; they are influences by prior activity and have18
self-sustaining qualities’ (Hodgson 1996, p.6). Veblen was inspired by
pragmatist philosophers and social scientists as James, Peirces and Dewey who
considered that habits make it possible to solve the problems of uncertainty and
complexity faced by human beings (Wallers 1988). But if habits repeat past
practises in routines, they are not opposite to purposeful behaviour, free will
and choice. Pragmatists say that habits are the primordial manifestation of
human intelligence. Stated in contemporary terminology, they economise
cognitive resources by reproduction of past actions in similar circumstances
and permit a focal attention on new situations. According to Hodgson, modern
economists (Becker for example) regard habits as an appendage of rational
choice (Hodgson 1996). The pragmatist and Institutionalist perspective is the
reverse: rational choice (economic calculus) is supported by habits, which
authorise to concentrate on strategic factors whereas every day existence is
driven by routinised rules of action.
Habits are the link between past and future. At the same time, they are a
factor of stability of behaviours, and authorise adaptative, innovative and
creative scope of action in an evolutionary perspective (that is to say in an
evolving environment).
Commons also stresses the habitual and ‘volitional’ dimensions of human
behaviour. He shares the pragmatist analysis of the human being, as a ‘creative
agency’ whose intelligence is grounded on rules and habits. But the originality
of his point of view lies in the unit of economic analysis he claims for (far
before Williamson and with very different implications): the transaction instead
of the individual. According to him, the individual cannot be considered as an
‘object of nature’, but as a part of an ongoing social process or, in his
terminology, as participants in transactions. Transactions are joint actions (or
collective actions) where individuals meet and where working rules control
and expand individual action. Through collective action, working rules set19
limits to individual action and, at the same time, are ‘a liberation of individual
action from coercition, duress, discrimination, or unfair competition, by means
of restraints placed on other individuals’ (Commons 1934, p.17). A transaction
is a situation of negotiation where rules are interpreted and adjusted and where
preferences and wills are altered, where collective rules and individual choices
are continually modified in the process of interaction (Bazzoli, Dutraive 1996).
This transactional point of view implies putting forward social interactions
and collective patterns in the conception of human psychology that he called
‘negociational psychology’, that is a ‘social psychology’ because individuals are
social beings and their actions are always transactions with others. Rules mould
perceptions, representations and actions, and bring order out of conflicts and
dependence between agents. But it is also a ‘volitional psychology’ which deals
with human purposes and wills in a context of radical uncertainty. Commons
considers the mind as ‘a creative agency looking toward the future and
manipulating the external world and other people in view of expected
consequences’ (Hodgson 1996, p.6). Will aims at exercising power over things
and other humans, grounded on expectation of consequences in a context of
uncertainty and complex social interactions. The fundamental ‘law of human
nature’ is then the search of a security of expectations. Habits satisfy this
fundamental need for reducing uncertainty and complexity. Commons calls
‘routines transactions’ activities, which do not imply conscious deliberation or
attention. They support ‘strategic transactions’ focused on a ‘limiting factor’ in
new situations wheres past rules or habits are inappropriate and need attention
and deliberation.
Institutionalism thus defends the fact that individual action occurs in real
time: present action is the result of expectations about the future and of a
process of learning from past experience which transforms sense-data into
information and knowledge and shapes individual choices in a context of20
radical uncertainty. In such context, perfect knowledge of the consequences of
actions and of possible alternatives is impossible. The neo-classical link
between rationality and optimisation is broken and replaced by a link between
purposeful action and habitual behaviour. Habits are the condition of the
creative activity of individual mind, which concentrates on innovation.
It now seems obvious that Austrians and Institutionalists are closely linked
according to the importance given to human behaviour: economics as a
praxeologic science, as Ludwig von Mises would state
26. The agent is seen as a
true actor (Langlois 1986) with an active and creative behaviour turned toward
an uncertain, unpredictable and widely indeterminate future. It is now able,
through market transactions, to exercise its intelligibility and economic
understanding. This aptitude stems, in one case from an extension of
individualism to subjectivism, and in the other from the integration of social
components into the formulation of market plans by individuals. Thus, and
although the analytical figures of such behaviours are specific, reflecting both
the issues and theoretical foundations of two distinctive paradigms, both
approaches understand behaviour as dealing with learning, adapting and
acquiring the knowledge needed to face the complexity and uncertainty linked
to economic action.
Towards an economics of time and ignorance
Finally, the Austrian and Institutional approaches converge in the exploration
of the reality of the historical time, uncertainty, and ignorance in which market
decisions and actions are taken. Doing so, they both contribute to the same
dynamics of market mechanisms, which is the one at work in ‘the economics of
time and ignorance’ (O'Driscoll, Rizzo 1996).21
The emphasis placed by the two traditions on the disequilibrium processes
and novelty cannot make do with an analysis which takes place in a logical
time framework, with no genuine causality, a time span for which ‘at any
moment (...), the past is determined just as much as the future’ (Robinson 1962,
p.26). Both tradition ‘takes time seriously’ and accept that the properties of
time, more precisely of a real time, characterise the sphere of economic activity.
The idea, shared by the two approaches, of an non-determined market
process involves a sequential causality (Hicks 1979) which seeks to identify
prior cause and subsequent effect, rather than to consider that everything
affects everything else simultaneously (Setterfield 1997, p.69). The behaviours
are therefore constrained by a strong history (David 1988), (the movement can
only be forward, there is no scope for moving backwards through history) and
the analysis is punctuated by the time of intention (Currie, Steedman 1990), that
is a time that, while connecting the experience from the past and the
expectations about the future to the objectives aimed through current decisions,
represents the main driving force behind individual behaviour.
The notions of short and long period loose their meaning in such a
framework; the Austrian and Institutionalist analysis of the market and
economic processes thus contribute to the elaboration of a historical time
framework: ‘In a historical model, causal relations have to be specified. Today
is a break in time between an unknown future and an irrevocable past. What
happens next will result from the interactions of the behaviour of human
beings within the economy. Movement can only be forward’ (Robinson 1962,
p.26).
Until now, the institutional dimension of the Austrian and Institutionalist
approaches has merely been stressed, whereas this dimension is essential in the
view of linking together the Austrian and Institutionalist standpoints within an22
ecumenical analysis of market processes which takes place in the economics of
time and ignorance (O'Driscoll, Rizzo 1996). Indeed, when the future is
unknowable, the expectations divergent and the discoordination forces as
strong as the co-ordination ones, social institutions may enter the picture in
order to align expectations and, doing so to be part of a theory of plan co-
ordination.
In this line, Boettke (1989) Garrouste (1995), Rutherford (1989a) and Vanberg
(1989) state that the Austrian and the Institutionalist conceptions of institutions
are more complementary than conflicting. Boettke shows a methodological
common ground between Veblen and the modern Austrian theory of
institutions
27. Garrouste and Vanberg, comparing respectively Veblen's and
Menger's conceptions of institutions for the first, and Commons' and Menger's
conception of evolution for the second, assert the complementarity thesis.
According to Garrouste, the Austrian conception is about the institutional
genesis, while Institutionalism is about institutional change. According to
Vanberg, the Austrian conception is about spontaneous institutions, while
Institutionalism is about designed institutions. Even the methodological
dissension can be dislocated in a via media between individualistic and holistic
points of view
28.
Our point of view, although contributing to the complementarity thesis, is
different in the sense that it analyses the nature and the role of institutions in
reference to the theoretical issue of the market process. Indeed, if the economic
analysis of institutions constitutes an essential link in the Austrian project of
building an alternative theory of markets, it is probably also the weakest one.
The benefit of the confrontation is thus no longer, in our point of view, to
underline the similarities but the complementarities in order to draw up a
theory of institutions compatible with an (Austrian) market process analysis.23
Market processes and institutional change: the flexibility vs
permanency dilemma
It is unanimously recognised that institutions are, in an Austrian approach, of
great influence to explain the market process
29. In this respect, Lachmann’s
argument is representative:
It would be wrong to think that a market economy, when faced with the
problems just outlined, could, or in the ordinary course of events would,
find no answer to them. History shows that whenever left sufficiently free
from political interference to evolve its response to such challenges, the
market economy has ‘grown’ the institutions necessary to deal with them.
(Lachmann 1978, p.67).
Information, knowledge and co-ordination of individual plans: the
institutions as points of orientation
The whole set of formulating concepts used to deal with social institutions,
relies basically on the notion of rule-following behaviour (Langlois 1993, p.166):
institutions are roughly regularities of behaviour understandable in terms of
rules, norms and routines (Nelson, Winter 1982). According to Schotter, the
definition of a social institution can be drawn from an Austrian perspective as
‘a regularity in social behaviour that is agreed to by all members of society,
specifies behaviour in specific recurrent situations and is either self-policed or
policed by some external authority’ (1981, p.11). Institutions are the means by
which agents are able to gather sufficient information in order to co-operate.
More precisely, institutions convey knowledge through at least three
different channels
30. As ‘congealed social knowledge’, they aim at reducing a
set of possible options, which amounts to saying that they reduce the agents'24
uncertainty related to each other’s actions. This involves a better co-ordination
of each individual plan according to environment specificities (O'Driscoll,
Rizzo 1996). Moreover, institutions do not transmit knowledge itself, but rather
the knowledge of how to make an effective use of skills that an individual will
never possess. The idea is thus that, if people can rely on others in order to
fulfil specific roles, then their expectations will be likely to be more co-
ordinated. Finally, institutions transmit knowledge in the sense that the routine
courses of action they embody are efficient adaptations to the environment
31.
In a word, institutions save knowledge and information (Lachmann 1970)
32.
Institutions then consist of general or enduring pieces of knowledge
(O’Driscoll, Rizzo 1996, p.xxii) which provide ‘points of orientation’ likely to
make actions and expectations relatively compatible (Lachmann 1970)
33. Any
practice that allows to reach individual goals spreads until it becomes an
institution.
The peculiar status granted to the institution within the Austrian framework
seems clearer now: since institutions are used to explain the transmission of
information and knowledge, which is integrated in the formation and revision
of plans, they represent the ‘key link’ that makes it possible to complete the
reasoning chain of the Austrian theory about market processes. O’Driscoll and
Rizzo indeed indicate that:
Rules provide, as it were, save bounds for behaviour in a relatively
unbounded world. Institutions are the social crystallisation of rule-following
behaviour or, in other words, the overall pattern of many individuals
following a similar rule (...). Thus, the circle is closed. Time and genuine
uncertainty promote the following of rules and the development of
institutions. The latter, in turn, serve to reduce, but not eliminate, the25
unboundness of the economic system by providing the stable patterns of
interaction (1996, p.6).
The validity of the proposition that there is (or is not) a tendency toward
equilibrium, thus depends critically on the nature of the institutional
arrangements (Garrison 1986)
34. Of course, the overall demonstration supposes
that the knowledge spread by institutions is stabilising (in the sense that it
constantly reaffirms the stability of the social framework) whereas the one
dispersed by the price system is of a dynamic nature (in the sense that it leads
individuals to a continuous revision of their plans) (Hayek 1945).
An endogenous explanation about the dynamics of institutions is however
required in order to loop the loop. Indeed, if institutions act as signposts in a
world of uncertainty, what we need is a theory of plan co-ordination, which
integrates the fact that, not only do social institutions serve to align
expectations, they may also deal successfully with the forces of change. It
would otherwise be difficult to concede that the institutional element achieving
to complete the analysis of the dynamic functioning of market processes will be
the only one outside these dynamics. It is then a matter of assessing the
Austrian representation in relation to its capacity for producing an analysis of
the evolution of institutions within a market economy.
Permanency and flexibility of institutions: an Austrian dilemma
Such analysis must allow solving three types of problems (Lachmann 1970,
pp.51-52). Firstly, there is the problem of institutional change and how to
reconcile the idea of an institutional change with that of an institution as a
‘point of orientation’, which assumes its fixity. Secondly, the issue of the
institutional order and its unity is formulated: if the complementarity of
institutions builds the institutional order of a society, the purpose is then to26
identify the forces of integration as well as the circumstances under which these
forces have stopped working. Finally, there is the question of the rise of new
institutions that is to underline the requirements needed for new institutions to
fit into the existing structure. Solving these three kinds of problems comes
down to providing a solution to what we have agreed to call the permanency-
flexibility dilemma: ‘If institutions are to remove uncertainty, they must be
permanent. But if they are to be shaped by market forces they must be flexible.
How, within the institutional order of modern market society, is this problem
resolved?’ (Lachmann 1994, p.50).
Although there is no place for the evolution of institutions within Menger’s
conception, the analysis of change is, on the contrary, an essential aspect of
Hayek’s approach to institutions (Garrouste 1994; 1998). The latter holds in the
idea mentioned above which imply that institutions embody efficient
adaptation modes according to the environment. This means that institutions
with inferior survival properties are removed by means of a selection
mechanism. Besides the fact that in Hayek’s analysis an imprecision is found
through the definition of the selection criterion (Garrouste 1994, p.863), as well
as through the explanation of those survival properties (O’Driscoll, Rizzo 1996,
p.40), such discussion of the dynamics of institutions cannot hold if the existing
complementarity
35 of institutions within an institutional order (Lachmann 1970)
is taken into consideration. The routine courses of action that comprise
institutions are indeed not all independent. Some truly inferior routines must
be maintained in order to permit the existence of those that are actually
superior: ‘The implication of these considerations is that, in the absence of a
clear conception of the nature of survival properties, we cannot know whether
any given institution or course of action is the most adaptative’ (O’Driscoll,
Rizzo 1996, p.40).27
Lachmann’s interpretation of the dynamics of institutions holds a distinctive
place within the Austrian approach. Besides the fact that it claims to go back to
a logic much more rooted in a Weberian discourse than in a Mengerian one, its
main purpose consists in drawing the conditions for the attainment of both
coherence and permanence of the institutional order, that is to deal with the
accurate issue of complementarity
36.
The overall demonstration is based on the distinction made by the author
between the ‘legal norms’ or ‘designed institutions’ which are ‘the products of
legislation and other manifestations of the “social will”’ (Lachmann 1970, p.69)
and the ‘recurrent patterns of conduct which we call institutions’ (ibid., p.75) or
‘undesigned institutions’
37. But, following Lachmann’s logic, if, on the one
hand, all institutions
38 do not take on the same status and function
39, they share,
on the other hand, the flexibility property linked to the permanency of a whole.
Indeed, the permanence of the institutional order as well as the legal one does
not indeed involve the permanence of each part: ‘Institutions rise and fall, they
move and change. An institution may last a long time, but during this time
assume new functions or discard old ones’ (ibid., p.77-78). The raising matter is
now how to make institutional change and structural permanence compatible,
since it is not so much the change per se which brings up here problems but
rather the unexpected one. Only the last type of change is likely to upset some
plans in the course of actions. The issue is of course all the more important
because the institutional change affects long-term plans. A much more harmful
outcome from the occurrence of this kind of unpredictable change concerns the
relationship between designed and undesigned institutions. Indeed, as
institutions can only be indeed designed to face specific well-known situations
‘the unexpected change of undesigned institutions may not merely jeopardise
the coherence of the institutional structure as a whole, but in addition may
obviate the very design of the designed institutions’ (ibid., p.80).28
The solution put forward by Lachmann in order to cope with this last kind of
problem consists in setting up designed institutions which allow to integrate
change without altering the institutional structure as a whole. The notion of
interstices within the legal order represents here a key component for the
institutional dynamics: ‘the undesigned institutions which evolve gradually as
the unintended and unforeseeable result of the pursuit of individual interests
accumulate in the interstices of the legal order’ (ibid., p.81). The function of
those interstices is actually to lead to the accumulation of sediments coming
from the evolution of undesigned institutions so that the coherence of the
whole remains. Hence, according to Lachmann, if a society is fundamentally
made of two types of institutions, the external ones which constitute the outer
framework of the society and the internal ones, which gradually evolve as a
result of market processes, the institutional dynamics however arise from the
specificity of those interstices, shared by both kind of institutions.
Such understanding of the institutional dynamics therefore involves various
comments
40. The proposed pattern stems from the assumption that only the
undesigned institutions evolve. But designed institutions also change. The
analysis of the institutional dynamics then requires to consider two emerging
issues: the first one is related to the structural change of designed institutions
and the second is linked to the relationship existing between the changes in the
legal order and the evolution of undesigned institutions. In other respects, it is
possible that the coherence and permanence of the current social order would
be jeopardised even without change in the legal system. It is particularly the
case when the slow evolution of institutions extends beyond the interstices of
an existing social and legal order, leading to what Lachmann has called as
‘deformation of social space’ (ibid., p.83). Although such relevant issues have
substantial implications in formulating an overall representation based on the
endogenous dynamics of institutions, they cannot be handle here. This stresses29
(if it was needed) all the difficulties faced by the Austrian theory in order to
elaborate a theory concerned with the evolution of institutions.
The confrontation with the Institutionalist analysis is from this perspective
decisive because it is precisely well known for being interested in the nature
and the evolution of institutions.
OIE on the evolution of institutions
We want to stress here that even if the Lachmannian conception in terms of
permanency-flexibility dilemma is formulated well enough as to embrace the
institutional foundation of market process, the response he gave is not fully
satisfying. The point is that the historicity of the economic process and the role
of individuals in the evolution process are not adequately thought about. The
Austrian conception is, in fact, prisoner of the image of a legal order (which is
permanent outside the flexibility inherent to market process) in regard to
market as an natural order that impedes it from a whole institutional dynamics
analysis, considering the evolution of legal order itself, in relation with the
global process of change. We think that the old institutional school can bring
elements to complete the unfulfilled Lachmannian framework.
The first point is that there is an originality of the general Institutionalist
conception of institutions that cannot be reduced to the ‘external’ co-ordination
function of institutions, even if some functional properties that Institutionalists
associate with institutions fit the Austrian’s conception: in a very uncertain
environment, individuals with bounded rationality need a pattern of co-
ordination; rules bring knowledge and information for plans and organise
actions out of complexity. Veblen called ‘Institution’ the ‘habits of thought
common to the generality of men’ (1919, p.239) when Commons definition was
‘collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action’
(Commons 1934, p.73). Even if they seem very different, theses quotations point30
out two important topics: action, choice and preference are not data but are
moulded by institutional settings; individual action cannot be isolated from a
process of social interaction. But this fundamental influence of institutions on
human value, preferences and modality of choice is not a deterministic one. If
institutional rules and norms mould individual actions and interactions, they
never totally determine the result of the economic and social process
41. As we
have already said, the individual is a creative agency of change at any level of
the institutional framework. The general principle of evolutionary dynamics
results from the interaction between institutional rules and principles and
human agency, that leads to an incremental and reinforcing change in the
structures and in the pattern of preferences and behaviours.
The second point is that the process is not always an efficient one. The
Institutionalist representation of evolution looks like the Hayekian ‘smooth
adaptation mechanism’, but with notable differences. The incremental
evolution of institutions and human behaviours can lead to crisis, disruption,
bifurcation and finally to real innovation. The criteria of selection in the
Austrian understanding of evolution is in accordance with the idea of efficiency
of practices vis-à-vis the environment, that is the behaviour of the most
successful group is imitated and developed. There is no such reference to
efficiency in the Institutional standpoint, which stresses that institutions do not
necessarily serve the functional needs of the society, but ‘vested interests’.
Veblen points out the existence of long-lived ‘imbecile institutions’, ‘archaic’
and ‘ceremonial’ habits of thought that restrict the potential benefits of the
spread of production and of technological innovations. Abandoning a
reasoning in terms of efficiency, OIE is thus more likely to release the
permanency-flexibility dilemma.
The third point, adopting Veblen's reasoning, is that the problem of
evolution is less a question of adaptation according to a criterion of efficiency,31
than a problem of coherence out of the institutional diversity in a general
institutional framework, and a problem of synchronisation in the historical
time. This idea is closely akin to Lachmann’s questioning about the genesis of
novelty inside a stable institutional framework or, put in theoretical terms, the
permanency versus flexibility dilemma. Yet, it departs from it in some
fundamental points including, on the one hand, the historicity and the path-
dependence magnitude of the evolutionary process and, on the other hand, the
idea that the economic process is a whole process of change, and not only a
change of ‘internal institutions’. The idea of Veblen is that human beings are
the result of a combination of fundamental instincts
42 selected by the
institutional configuration. Institutional patterns remove internal variation and
stabilise individual behaviour. As Hodgson showed, in a self-reinforcing
mechanism, institutions become locked in relatively stable and constrained
paths of development (1994). In this line, there is a relative invariance and self-
reinforcing character of institutions. For Veblen, this process can lead to an
incompatibility or incoherence between predominant institutional principles
and the material or technological state of the art. The instinctual human nature
is an element of an endogenous tendency of evolution, because human action
can generate novelty, diversity in the practices and new routines, particularly
in the technological area. In contrast, the stability of the institutional principle
(the institutional lag) can bring conflict with the actual conditions of economic
life. In other words, a disruption can emerge in the evolutionary process
because of a temporal gap between, on the one hand, past and self enforcing
routines and, on the other hand, new habits of thought stemming from the
human creativity. ‘Institutional development and change in these terms can be
linked to strata shifting slowly at different rates, but occasionally causing
seismic disturbance and discontinuities’ (Hodgson 1994, p.65).32
The last point concerns the articulation between designed and undesigned
aspects of institutional evolution. Precisely, Lachmann links together the
stability property of the legal order (seen as a designed institution) and the
dynamic property of market process (seen as undesigned) with his idea of
interstice between internal and external institutions (see supra). Underlying the
legal order of the market, Lachmann shares Commons’ interest in The legal
foundation of capitalism (1924) and the importance of the ‘legal/economic
nexus’
43 in the understanding of the logic of economic transactions, but
Commons' conception is a more evolutionary analysis, that includes the change
in legal order itself. According to Commons, evolution is a ‘volitional process’
submitted to an ‘artificial selection’ (Ramstad 1990; 1994). This perspective is in
radical opposition with the natural selection metaphor of economic evolution in
as much as it relates to what is usually taken as undesigned institutions, like
money. Commons gave a subtle demonstration that economic order itself is an
artefact
44. But this conception is not as deterministic as a superficial evaluation
could conclude, because Institutional Economics do not devote a crude holistic
viewpoint but a combination of institutional causation and individual causation
for understanding social process. Working rules delimit and support the
transactions but transactions give rise to unanticipated consequences, new
opportunities and conflict about the share of ‘burdens and benefits’ of the
wealth created by collective action. The economic process includes a never
ending process of making new rules regulating conflicts of interests, because a
procedural resolution of conflicts is a necessary support for transactions and
order. This is an ‘artificial selection’ because the choice (if not the emergence) of
new rules is the fact of, and the reflect of the purpose of authoritative figures.
‘Commons understood the economic process to involve a circular causation in
which the individual will and its objective expression, a choice, is at one
consequence and cause of working rules’ (Ramstad 1990, p.79).33
The point is that legal order is not only, as in Lachmann’s conception, an
institutional matrix for market forces (that eventually impedes market forces
from efficiency) or in Lachmann’s terms, an external institution that evolves
independently from economic process
45 and whose function is to support
stability of fundamental principles of market and to correct markets failures
(uncertainty and information problems). Indeed in Commons’ analysis, the
legal order is (so to speak) inside each transaction
46 (intrinsically defined and
ordered by working rules) and evolves in close articulation with the economic
process itself. Evolution is an incremental process of change of rules and
behaviours, and the diversity of practices is filtered by an ‘artificial selection’ of
new rules promoted by authority figures. One consequence is that there is no
such strict distinction between designed and undesigned institutions. All
forms, at any level of the hierarchy of the institutional framework, are in part
designed and in part spontaneously produced.
In this line, the figure of the market is not that of a natural order but that of a
historical and social product of evolution, that is a set of rules and
arrangements purposefully selected out of conflicts.
The Austrian conception of institutional evolution fails to undertake the very
nature of market process as an evolving set of institutions, because the market
is understood as an immutable order (in its essence if not in its form)
independent of the ‘volitional’ process of selection of rules that incarnates it.
Austrians not only refuse the idea of the authoritative choice at work in the
market process (understood as a corruption of the well functioning of the
system), but so doing, they underestimate the real potential creativity of
individuals. The market process is thus, in fine, an abstract constituting
principle of people's interactions, not an historical product of the creative
agency, because people’s actions never influence the form and principles of the34
market system. In contrast, Institutional Economics understand the market
system as a never ending process of change in practices and rules; in this line,
the market is never always the same, but a changing institutional configuration.
The Austrian analysis explains the permanency in reference to the naturality of
catallactic principles but in the same time this reference prevents it from a
satisfying evolutionary conception. The flexibility of the market process is not
evolution. In the reverse, the Institutionalist analysis is able to loop the loop
Lachmann’s reasoning about the institutional dynamic. If institutions provide
‘points of orientation’ and ‘patterns of co-ordination’ for transactions,
transactions induce a permanent and cumulative process of change in
institutions themselves, and at the highest level of the institutional structure,
create an evolution of the legal order itself. The general order is, in this line, not
set up as an abstract and permanent principle, but as a real product of human
will in conflict/co-operation, and as a result of a cumulative and historical
process.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to lay out the broad lines of a positive
confrontation between the Austrian analysis and the Institutionalist one,
founded on the market co-ordination theme. Such an approach, though being a
priori heretical is justified by, on the one hand, the characteristics shared by
both theoretical traditions, and on the other by the existence of
complementarity, which founds a representation of market mechanisms in
terms of process. The analysis thus obtained, which grants a crucial place to the
dynamics of institutions, builds a bridge between two traditions which have
more to exchange than is usually thought, particularly in the perspective of the
elaboration of an alternative theory of the market inside which time matters.3536
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1 In addition to the Symposium on Austrian and Institutional Economics (Samuels 1989), see
Garrouste (1995), Wynarczyk (1992), Leathers (1990; 1989), Vanberg (1989), Gunning (1986).
2 The fact that both Austrian and Institutional economics are internally heterogeneous makes
comparisons between these two research traditions difficult, since one has to identify
'representative' members for both. Our purpose is not to be exhaustive but to highlight some
similarities and possible complementarities between the two schools regarding the notion of
market process.45
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 This project has been formulated by Wynarczyk (1992).
4 Jaffé (1976) has argued that Veblen’s critique of the economic man fits Jevon’s and Walras’s
theory better than Menger’s.
5 Veblen also discussed Böhm Bawerk’s theory of capital, but we do not examine here this
analytical link between the Austrian and Institutional thoughts. See Veblen (1891-1892).
6 According to Garrouste, these approaches are more complementary than usually considered
because Menger focuses on the institutional genesis, while Veblen focuses on institutional
change (Garrouste 1995).
7 Leather’s concluding statement is that ‘a close inspection, (...) reveals substantial differences
in their concepts of instincts. Veblen developed a more general theory of the types of instincts
and how instinctive proclivities interact with acquired habits to shape human behaviour.
Hayek’s instincts of solidarity and altruism resemble in some respects Veblen’s parental bent,
but there are no hayekian counterparts to the instincts of workmanship and idle curiosity’
(Leather 1990, p.175).
8 Mitchell wrote the introduction to an English version of Wieser’s Social Economics and
Hayek studied with him in the early twenties.
9 We set out general principles for the methodological opposition between the two traditions
that are inevitably overdone. A close examination, which is not the main object of this
contribution, would show a great methodological diversity within both traditions.
10 Neither Veblen, nor Commons or even Mitchell defends an a-theoretical conception of
economic science. Their works are rather attempts to fit the theory with the actual economic
characteristics, as they considered that the classical and neo-classical theories fitted the
eighteenth’s century capitalist economic system, not the actual system.
11 We underline.
12 The ‘traditional’ Austrian theory of the market process refers to the contributions of Hayek,
Mises, Kirzner and Lachmann.46
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 For an analysis of how Austrians have used the equilibrium construct, see Fink and Cowen
(1985).
14 Of course, Kirzner does not share this position.
15 Let us remind that ‘The concept of order (...) has the advantage that we can meaningfully
speak about an order being approached to various degrees, and that order can be preserved
throughout a process of change. While an economic equilibrium never really exists, there is
some justifications for asserting that the kind of order of which our theory describes an ideal
type, is approached in a high degree’ (Hayek 1978, p.184).
16 Typical events are events, which an observer perceives as being repeated regularly, as long
as the process itself is being repeated. Unique events are the ones that occur only once and are
thus time dependent; they can never be discovered (O'Driscoll, Rizzo 1996).
17 Quoted by Hodgson (1994, p.66).
18 It is not our purpose to expose the very dense theoretical system of Commons, based on very
interesting concepts as transaction, going concern, working rules, sovereignty, negociational
psychology, institutionalised mind, reasonable value.… For a more complete exposition, see
Ramstad (1990). Our purpose is just to connect Commons’ approach to the question of
equilibrium.
19 It is here impossible to pass over the Institutionalist criticism of the subjectivist approach.
The main target of this criticism is the rational and hedonistic character of the ‘Austrian
subjectivist economic man’. However, it is possible to demonstrate, considering the works of
Perlman (1986), Boettke (1989) and Wynarczyk (1992), that the praxeologic approach not only
dismissed the alleged rationality of the Benthamite calculus but also the hedonism which
motivated it.
20 That is, a reasoning which tries to take into account the subjective character of both
anticipations and knowledge (Lachmann 1976).
21 We underline.47
                                                                                                                                                                  
22 ‘Successive stages of market processes thus reflect nothing so much as successive modes of
re-orientation as the mind of the actors fits means to ends in ever new forms prompted by new
forms of knowledge and imagination’ (Lachmann 1986, p.5).
23 ‘In a competitive game there are winners and losers. By the same token, competitive market
forces will cause discoordination as well as co-ordination of agents' plans. In fact they cannot
do the latter without doing the former’ (Lachmann 1986, p.5).
24 We cannot resist the pleasure to quote Veblen’s famous description of the so-called economic
man: ‘The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lighting calculator of pleasures and pains,
who occilates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli
that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent.
He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of
impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another. Self-poised in elemental space,
he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until the parallelogram of forces bears
down upon him, where-upon he follows the line of the resultant. When the force of the impact
is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before’ (Veblen 1898, pp. 389-
90).
25 Veblen's idea of human behaviour is also grounded on a few fundamental instincts, but we
do not develop this aspect here.
26 Let us remind that ‘praxeology rests on the fundamental axiom that individual human
beings act, that is, on the primordial fact that individuals engage in conscious actions toward
chosen goals. This concept of action contrasts to purely reflexive, or knee-jerk, behaviour,
which is not directed toward goals’ (Rothbard 1976, p.19).
27 ‘The Austrian criticism of neo-classical economics is firmly ground in a Veblenian
appreciation of institutional and historical factors in economics’ (Boettke 1989, p.74).
28 According to Rutherford, mentioning Agassi’s institutional individualism (1987), ‘At least a
significant part of work of Institutionalists and Austrians is not as methodologically
incompatible as is usually thought’ (1989a, p.164).48
                                                                                                                                                                  
29 See for example the new introduction of the second edition of O’Driscoll and Rizzo’s book
(1996, p.xxii); see also Garrouste (1995; 1994) and the contributions in Boettke and Prychitko
(eds) (1994). It is the very same motive which induces Langlois to state that ‘Menger has
perhaps more claim to be the patron saint of the New Institutional Economics than has any of
the original Institutionalists’ (Langlois 1986, p.5).
30 Here, we still consider an overall Austrian point of view.
31 This last conception (from Hayek) is examined below.
32 The role of institutions in reducing information costs is outlined by the game-theory
approach through such notions as ‘convention’ (co-ordination game) or ‘norm’ (prisoners’
dilemma game) (Schotter 1994).
33 ‘An institution provides means of orientation to a large number of actors. It enables them to
co-ordinate actions by means of orientation to a common signpost’ (Lachmann 1970, p.45). The
so-called concept of ‘orientation points’ expresses the idea of a decreasing instead of an
elimination of uncertainty (Lachmann 1994).
34 Indeed ‘so long as the arrangements are such that expectations consistent with underlying
economic realities are rewarded and expectations consistent with those realities are penalised,
the tendency can be expected to prevail’ (Garrison 1986, p.97).
35 O’Driscoll and Rizzo use the term indivisibility (1996).
36 We do not however introduce the analysis about coherence.
37 One may recognise here the Mengerian distinction between pragmatic and organic
institutions.
38 In the broad sense of the term, that is, taking into account both designed and undesigned
institutions.
39 Some are more fundamental than others in the sense that they are basic institutions of the
market society: ‘They must exist before there can be markets which function smoothly’
(Lachmann 1994, p.50).
40 Lachmann himself has first suggested these remarks.49
                                                                                                                                                                  
41 Lachmann and more generally Austrian Economics take these arguments into account, but
they appear to be marginal when they constitute the heart of the Institutional analysis.
42 According to Veblen, the idea of instinct justifies the selection of institutionalised behaviours
out of the diversity of conducts grounded on instinctual proclivity (workmanship instinct,
parental bent, idle curiosity, and predatory instinct). This idea of instinctual proclivity in
human behaviour is not inconsistent with an evolutionary conception of human being; it is a
dialectical vision of human beings, between stability and evolution.
43 For Commons, the relations that economics study is not the so-called exchange of goods, but
a transfer of property rights: ‘Transactions, as thus defined, are not the exchange of
commodities, in the physical sense of delivery, they are the alienation and acquisition, between
individuals, of the rights of future ownership of physical things, as determined by the
collective working rules of society. The transfer of these rights must therefore be negotiated
between the parties concerned, according to the working rules of the society, before labour can
produce, or consumers can consume, or commodities be physically delivered to other persons’
(1934, p.58). This conception justifies that legal and economic perspectives cannot be
analytically separated.
44 For a very detailed exposition see Ramstad (1990).
45 Lachmann embraces the ‘public choice’ idea that laws are made by judges in a political
process in accordance with a pure methodological individualism (Lachmann 1979).
46 According to Commons, a transaction always involves a minimum of five protagonists: a
seller and a buyer, an alternative seller and an alternative buyer, and the legal authorities that
embody the process of arbitrating conflicts with rules. ‘Consequently, if transactions are to go
on peaceably without resort to violence between the parties there must always have been a
fifth party to the transaction, namely, a judge, priest, chieftain, paterfamilias, arbitrator,
foreman, superintendent, general manager, who would be able to decide and settle the
dispute, with the aid of the combined power of the group to which the five parties belonged’
(Commons 1924, p.67).